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One area of physics education research has focused on the nature of ontologies (mental catego-
rizations of concepts, substances and processes), and how they might be used to gain insight into
student thinking when learning classical physics. There has been some debate about whether stu-
dent and expert ontologies in classical contexts should be thought of as stable cognitive structures or
dynamic cognitive processes, and what implications these different perspectives have for instruction.
We extend this discussion of ontologies and their role in learning and cognition to the context of
quantum physics, by first considering various types of epistemological and ontological commitments
exhibited by experts in their descriptions of quantum phenomena. Excerpts from student inter-
views and responses to survey questions are used to demonstrate the contextual nature of students’
quantum ontologies, which can be best understood within a resources framework. Instructional
implications are discussed, including a brief description of a modern physics curriculum designed to
explicitly attend to student ontologies.
PACS numbers: 01.40.Fk, 01.40.Ha, 03.65-w
I. INTRODUCTION
Physics education research has shown that, when it
comes to certain topics, student thinking can be no-
toriously resistant to change via direct instruction. In
many cases, such learning difficulties can be understood
as stemming from the prior knowledge of students, which
somehow interferes with the learning process, so that
something must change before a proper (scientifically
normative) understanding can be achieved. Precisely
what it is that is supposed to change in the minds of
learners, whether it be concepts, beliefs, epistemologi-
cal framings or ontologies, is where education researchers
primarily diverge [1].
An ontology is normally understood within the learn-
ing sciences as a mental categorization of concepts, sub-
stances and processes according to their fundamental
properties, where entities with similar characteristics be-
long to the same or similar categories. One line of re-
search posits that some of the conceptual barriers faced
by students can be traced to inappropriate degrees of
commitment to ontological category assignments that are
unproductive. A generally accepted hypothesis is that
when learners encounter an unfamiliar concept, they en-
gage in a (conscious or unconscious) act of ontological
categorization, whereby the new concept is sorted ac-
cording to whatever information is available at the time.
This may include: the context in which the concept is
introduced, its co-occurence with other concepts, or lan-
guage patterns that are indicative of its ontological na-
ture. Once a category has been settled upon, it is thought
that learners then automatically associate with that con-
cept the attributes of other, more familiar concepts that
fall within the same category. In other words, the new
concept inherits the characteristics of other concepts that
are, in the mind of the learner, ontologically similar [2].
There are opposing views with respect to ontologies
about the nature of novice and expert reasoning, each
with different implications for instruction. According to
some, when a learner’s category assignment for a given
concept is sufficiently distinct from the targeted (scien-
tifically accepted) category, the process of reassignment
cannot come about in gradual steps, and the initial con-
ceptualization must be suppressed in favor of one with
other attributes [2, 3]. This incompatibility hypothesis
is a key aspect of Chi’s description of radical conceptual
change, and motivates an instructional approach that ad-
heres to ‘ontological correctness’. For example, emergent
processes (such as electric current, resulting from the net
motion of individual charged particles) are often alterna-
tively conceptualized by students as material substances
(e.g., electric current as a fluid that can be stored and
consumed) [4]. Slotta and Chi suggest that such miscon-
ceptions might be avoided if instructors were to eschew
materialistic analogies for electricity (such as water flow-
ing through a pipe) [5].
Others object to this delineation of ontologies into dis-
tinct, normative categories, and instead argue that both
students and experts often bridge between (and some-
times blend) different ontologies in ways that are pro-
ductive [6, 7]. Examples have been given of students
productively using substance-based ontologies for energy
[8] and gravity [9] as motivation for an instructional ap-
proach that leverages exactly the type of novice reason-
ing that Slotta and Chi suggest ought to be suppressed.
Gupta, et al. argue that, rather than there being just
one “correct” ontology for a given concept that should
be promoted in the classroom, different ontologies can
be sometimes more productive, and sometimes less, de-
pending on the specific context. [6].
The differences between these two models of cognition
are analogous to those between material substances and
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2emergent processes: ontologies as stable cognitive struc-
tures (which is one way of accounting for the robustness
of student misconceptions) versus ontologies as dynamic
cognitive processes, emerging in real time through the
coordinated activation of conceptual resources (that are
in themselves neither right nor wrong) [10]. Although
they differ in their implications for instruction, these two
perspectives are not entirely incompatible. Both agree
that the learning of new concepts is mediated (and some-
times hindered) by prior knowledge, and that difficulties
can arise from the misattribution of ontological charac-
teristics to unfamiliar concepts. Most importantly, both
allow for the possibility of productively using multiple
parallel ontologies for a single concept, if accompanied
by a sufficient understanding of the inherent bounds and
limitations of each.
We wish to extend this discussion on learning and cog-
nition to the context of quantum physics, where students
often have difficulty reconciling their classical intuitions
with the behavior of quantum entities. We argue that
some of these difficulties can be understood in terms of
what we’ll call classical attribute inheritance. For exam-
ple, many students persist in always ascribing a local-
ized position to electrons because they also possess the
attributes of mass and charge, which are all normally as-
sociated with classical particles. This may then act as a
barrier to developing a full understanding of phenomena
that entail both particle and wave descriptions.
Our prior research has demonstrated that student
thinking can be differentially influenced by the myriad
ways in which instructors choose (or choose not) to ad-
dress interpretive themes in quantum mechanics, and
that these instructional choices manifest themselves both
explicitly and implicitly in the classroom [11–16]. In this
paper, we show that students exhibit varying degrees of
flexibility in their ontological categorizations of electrons,
and present evidence of them not only switching between
categories (both within and across contexts), but also
creating a blended category by classifying electrons as si-
multaneously both particle and wave. We find that stu-
dents frequently modify their conceptions of quanta in
a piecewise manner, often without looking for or requir-
ing internal consistency. Even when their instructors de-
emphasize interpretation (explicitly or otherwise), stu-
dents still develop their own ideas about quantum phe-
nomena, some of which emerge spontaneously as a form
of sense making. Such insights have motivated our devel-
opment of a curriculum designed to strengthen students’
abilities to physically interpret quantum theory, and to
understand the domains of applicability of those inter-
pretations.
II. ONTOLOGIES IN QUANTUM PHYSICS
Wave-particle duality makes ontological flexibility nec-
essary for understanding the various ways that physi-
cists describe quantum phenomena. For example, when a
FIG. 1. Buildup of an electron interference pattern. Single
electrons are initially detected at seemingly random places,
yet an interference pattern is still observed after detecting
many electrons. [17]
double-slit experiment is performed with a low-intensity
beam, each electron will register individually at the de-
tector, yet an interference pattern will still be seen to
develop over time [17, 18]. [See Fig. 1.] Interference is
a property associated with waves, whereas localized de-
tections are indicative of a particle-like nature. Expert
physicists will interpret this experimental result differ-
ently, depending on their epistemological and ontological
commitments.
The standard Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
mechanics [19] would say this experiment reveals two
sides of a more abstract whole; an electron is neither par-
ticle nor wave. The dual use of (classically) distinct on-
tological categories is just a way of understanding the be-
havior of electrons in terms of more familiar macroscopic
concepts. A wave function is used to describe electrons
as they propagate through space, and the collapse pos-
tulate is invoked to explain localized detections, but any
switch between ‘particle’ and ‘wave’ occurs only in the
sense of how the electron is being represented. The wave
function is nothing more than a mathematical construct
used to make predictions about measurement outcomes,
without reference to any underlying reality.
From a Matter-Wave perspective, the wave function is
(for all intents and purposes) physically real: each elec-
tron is a delocalized wave as it propagates through both
slits and interferes with itself; it then randomly deposits
its energy at a single point in space when it interacts with
the detector. The collapse of the wave function is viewed
as a process not described by the Schro¨dinger equation, in
which the electron physically transitions from a delocal-
ized state (wave) to one that is localized in space (par-
ticle) [20]. This way of thinking about electrons might
be at odds with relativity theory, though this is gener-
ally only problematic within the context of distant, cor-
related measurements performed on entangled systems
[21]. Many physicists are comfortable with employing
this model in situations where relativity does not come
into play, which underscores the fact that not all experts
feel the need to subscribe to a single ontology that has
universal applicability.
This experiment might also be used to motivate a Sta-
tistical (or, ensemble) interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics [22], as Ballentine does in the introductory chapter of
his graduate-level textbook:
“When first discovered, particle diffraction
3was a source of great puzzlement. Are ‘par-
ticles’ really ‘waves’? In the early experi-
ments, the diffraction patterns were detected
holistically by means of a photographic plate,
which could not detect individual particles.
As a result, the notion grew that particle and
wave properties were mutually incompatible,
or complementary, in the sense that differ-
ent measurement apparatuses would be re-
quired to observe them. That idea, however,
was only an unfortunate generalization from a
technological limitation. Today it is possible
to detect the arrival of individual electrons,
and to see the diffraction pattern emerge as
a statistical pattern made up of many small
spots. Evidently, quantum particles are in-
deed particles, but particles whose behavior
is very different from what classical physics
would have led us to expect.” [23]
Ballentine assumes that localized detections imply that
electrons are localized throughout the experiment, always
passing through one slit or the other (but not both).
He explains diffraction patterns in terms of a quantized
transfer of momentum between a localized particle and
a periodic object. An electron may be different from a
classical particle, but it is a particle nonetheless, and de-
partures from classical physics can mostly be ascribed to
the existence of a quantum of action. The wave function
only encodes probabilities for the outcomes of measure-
ments performed on an ensemble of identically prepared
systems.
In a Pilot-Wave theory [24, 25], localized particles fol-
low trajectories determined by a quantum potential that
interacts non-locally with the apparatus; an electron is
simultaneously both a particle that goes through only
one slit, and a wave that passes through both. The ini-
tial conditions for each electron (which are unknowable
to the experimenter) predetermine where its particle as-
pect will land on the detecting screen. [See Fig. 2.] This
hidden-variable theory is not incompatible with the re-
sults of Bell’s theorem, which only requires such theories
to be non-local in order to reproduce the predictions of
quantum mechanics [26].
There are still more ways to interpret these experimen-
tal results [27, 28], but they are typically not discussed
in any detail in undergraduate quantum mechanics in-
struction. The term Agnostic can be used to describe a
perspective that takes no firm stance on the correctness
of any one of the above interpretations. The Copenhagen
interpretation seems to be favored by most physicists, not
only for historical reasons; by making no claims about the
true nature of reality (other than that it is inaccessible),
it allows physicists to focus more on the predictive power
of quantum mechanics (“Shut up and calculate!” [29]).
This pragmatic attitude is often reflected in the class-
room, and so we also use the terms Copenhagen/Agnostic
jointly below to denote a common instructional approach
that de-emphasizes interpretive discussions in favor of de-
FIG. 2. Time-averaged trajectories of localized particles in a
double-slit experiment, according to Bohm’s pilot-wave inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics. [24]
veloping mathematical tools.
Regardless of one’s personal preferences, it should be
clear that a thorough understanding of quantum the-
ory requires some amount of ontological flexibility. Even
though Ballentine may appear to be inflexible in his on-
tological views on quantum particles, he must still have
facility with other ontologies in order to properly under-
stand the views of other physicists. Experts have devel-
oped the sophistication to know when it is (and is not)
appropriate to employ each type of description. When
first learning about quantum mechanics, students are in
the process of developing this sophistication, and they
can be influenced by the pedagogical choices of their in-
structors.
III. STUDENTS’ QUANTUM ONTOLOGIES
A. Online Surveys and Aggregate Responses
We first observed the contextual nature of student on-
tologies in the responses of modern physics students at
the University of Colorado to a series of survey questions
designed to probe their epistemological and ontological
commitments in the context of quantum mechanics. It
was emphasized at the beginning of this online survey
that we were asking students to express their own be-
liefs, and that their specific answers would not affect any
evaluation of them as students. One of the survey ques-
tions asked them to respond using a 5-point Likert scale
(from strong agreement to strong disagreement) to the
statement, When not being observed, an electron in an
atom still exists at a definite (but unknown) position at
each moment in time, and to explain their reasoning.
Some of the survey statements have evolved over time,
primarily in the early stages of our research; modifica-
tions were usually motivated by a fair number of stu-
dents providing reasoning that indicated they were not
interpreting the statements as intended. We conducted
4FIG. 3. A sequence of screen shots from the Quantum Wave
Interference PhET simulation [30]: (A) a bright spot emerges
from an electron gun; (B) passes through both slits; and (C)
a single electron is detected on the far screen (highlighted
in this figure by the circle). After many electrons, a fringe
pattern develops (not shown).
validation interviews with 19 students in 2009 (see be-
low), after which the phrasing has remained essentially
unchanged. The survey responses presented in this pa-
per were all collected after the validation interviews had
taken place. The agree and strongly agree responses have
been collapsed into a single category (agreement), and
similarly for disagree and strongly disagree.
An additional essay question at the end of the survey
presented statements made by three fictional students
regarding their interpretation of how the double-slit ex-
periment with single electrons is depicted in the PhET
Quantum Wave Interference simulation [30] (as shown in
Fig. 3):
Student 1: The probability density is so
large because we don’t know the true posi-
tion of the electron. Since only a single dot
at a time appears on the detecting screen, the
electron must have been a tiny particle, trav-
eling somewhere inside that blob, so that the
electron went through one slit or the other on
its way to the point where it was detected.
Student 2: The blob represents the electron
itself, since an electron is described by a wave
packet that will spread out over time. The
electron acts as a wave and will go through
both slits and interfere with itself. That’s
why a distinct interference pattern will show
up on the screen after shooting many elec-
trons.
Student 3: Quantum mechanics is only
about predicting the outcomes of measure-
ments, so we really can’t know anything
about what the electron is doing between be-
ing emitted from the gun and being detected
on the screen.
Respondents were asked to state which students (if any)
they agreed with, and to explain their reasoning.
Student responses to the double-slit essay question
were generally aligned with the type of instruction they
received in the classroom [16]. One instructor taught
that each electron goes through one slit or the other, but
any attempt to determine which one will disrupt the in-
terference pattern; these students were the most likely to
agree with Student 1. Student 2’s statement was over-
whelmingly preferred by students from a class where the
instructor described the electron as a wave that passes
through both slits. Responses were more varied from
a course in which the instructor explained that a “quan-
tum mechanical wave of probability” passes through both
slits, but ultimately emphasized calculating features of
the interference pattern over physically interpreting the
result; these students were equally likely (within statisti-
cal error) to agree with any one of the three statements.
We have observed a common tendency for instructors
to spend more time discussing the physical interpreta-
tion of the wave function at the outset of the course (e.g.
when introducing the double-slit experiment), and devote
much less time to such explicit discussion in later topics
(e.g., the Schro¨dinger model of hydrogen). In contrast
to the results for the double-slit essay question, most
students from all three types of courses agreed with the
statement that atomic electrons exist as localized parti-
cles when not being observed. [See Ref. [16], where the
influence of instruction on student thinking is explored
in greater detail.]
Combining student data from all three of these courses,
so that responses to the statement about atomic electrons
are grouped by how those same students responded to
the double-slit essay question [Fig. 4], we see that stu-
dents who preferred the particle description of electrons
in the double-slit experiment were the most consistent,
in that almost all of them also agreed with the statement
that atomic electrons are localized in space. Over half
of those who preferred a wave description of electrons in
the double-slit experiment agreed that atomic electrons
FIG. 4. Combined student responses to the statement: When
not being observed, an electron in an atom still exists at a defi-
nite (but unknown) position at each moment in time, grouped
by how those same students responded to the double-slit es-
say question. Error bars represent the standard error on the
proportion.
5exist as localized particles, and a third of them disagreed.
Students who preferred the Copenhagen/Agnostic state-
ment of fictional Student 3 also tended to agree with this
statement; those who did not agree were evenly split be-
tween disagreement and a neutral stance.
Such findings indicate that students can be influenced
by explicit instruction in a measurable way, but that their
ontological perspectives on electrons are not necessarily
stable across contexts. Notice also that most students
defaulted to an intuitive, classical view of electrons as
localized particles in a context where instructors did not
adequately attend to student ontologies. These results
motivated a more detailed exploration of student con-
ceptions of quantum phenomena.
B. Student Interviews: Participants and Methods
Students were recruited for 1-hour interviews from four
modern physics offerings at the University of Colorado in
a single academic year (two offerings per semester, one for
engineering students and one for physics majors). A total
of 19 students were interviewed, either in the last week of
the semester or after the course had ended. Participants
from the physics courses were all physics or engineering
physics majors, plus one astronomy major; those from
the engineering courses were all mechanical or electrical
engineering majors, plus one mathematics major. The
average final course grade for all 19 students was 3.4 out
of 4.0, while overall averages for each course fell in the
2.0 - 3.0 range, meaning the participants were generally
better than average students (as might be expected for a
group of volunteers).
12 of the 19 students had already responded to the
post-instruction online survey before the interviews took
place; their survey responses were consistent with their
interview responses in almost every case (two of them
switched from a neutral stance in the survey to agreement
during the interview with the atomic electrons state-
ment). We found no correlations between how students
responded during the interviews and how their particu-
lar instructor discussed interpretation during class, likely
due to the small number of participants from each course.
Each interview began by asking the student to sim-
ply describe an electron, in words or pictures. 15 of
the 19 students talked about them first and foremost as
constituents of atoms, and all but one of the remain-
ing four eventually mentioned atomic electrons without
any prompting. Most of them used a planetary model
as a first-pass description, though every student claimed
(when asked) that they were aware the Bohr model is
not an accurate description. When asked to elaborate,
the majority of them eventually stated that the electron
is more properly described by an electron cloud, or a
cloud of probability. Once a clear picture had been es-
tablished of how each student thought of electrons in the
context of atoms, they were then asked to respond to the
atomic electrons statement and explain their reasoning.
In every case, their responses were consistent with the
descriptions they had given immediately prior.
We then asked students to describe the setup of the
double-slit experiment and what is observed, so as to
first establish that each of them had sufficient content
knowledge before going on to discuss the implications
of the results. Every student talked about the fringe
pattern in terms of wave interference, and all but one
knew that attempts to determine which-path information
would disrupt the pattern. They were also all aware that
the experiment could be run with single electrons, and
that an interference pattern would still develop over time.
Afterwards, students responded to the double-slit es-
say question by reading the three statements one at a
time, discussing their response to each before moving on
to the next statement. The interviewees did not neces-
sarily respond to these statements in a way that was con-
sistent with their earlier view of atomic electrons. Some
switched from particle to wave descriptions, though no
student applied first a wave description of atomic elec-
trons and then a particle description in the double-slit
experiment. In some cases, their responses to one of the
three statements was inconsistent with their responses to
the other two.
C. Individual Survey and Interview Responses
1. Particle ontologies and classical attribute inheritance
In classical physics, as in colloquial usage, the word
particle connotes some small object with negligible spa-
tial extent. It should therefore not be too surprising that
many introductory quantum physics students persist in
thinking of electrons in this way, particularly when in-
structors continue to refer to them as particles, even af-
ter they have stressed that they also possess distinctly
different attributes.
During the interviews, three students remained com-
mitted throughout to a strictly particle description of
electrons. They all claimed that wave functions are just
mathematical tools, used only for describing where an
electron is likely to be found when a position measure-
ment is made. Students A & B (among others; see be-
low) also made statements that suggest their ontological
views had been influenced by classical attribute inheri-
tance: spatial localization goes hand-in-hand with other
attributes like mass and charge:
STUDENT A: I guess an electron has to
[exist at] a definite point. It is a particle,
we’ve found it has mass and it has these in-
trinsic qualities, like the charge it has, so it
will have a definite position, but due to uncer-
tainty it will be a position that is unknown.
STUDENT B: I can’t picture it any other
way. I can’t picture it not having a definite
position, because it is a piece of mass, too.
6Similar statements have been made by other students
who were not interviewed, in their online responses to
the atomic electrons statement; for example:
STUDENT C: I feel that electrons are par-
ticles with mass so they will have a definite
position.
STUDENT D: I believe even if it’s not be-
ing observed, it still produces the negative
charge. Since charge doesn’t just go away,
the electron MUST exist there.
What is important to notice about these statements
is the difficulty students have with attributing mass or
charge to an electron without also ascribing to it a lo-
calized position. Introductory quantum physics students
know that classical electrons have all three attributes,
but they are less comfortable with the idea of a quantum
electron that sometimes possesses only two of the three.
In a similar vein, others will argue that charge (or mass)
could not be conserved if the electron were not located at
a single position. These student quotes serve as evidence
for how the ontology being employed by students may
influence their reasoning (or vice-versa), and how prior
knowledge can interfere with developing new conceptions
of light and matter.
2. Conflicts with intuition
Four other students initially described electrons as lo-
calized particles during the interviews, but eventually wa-
vered in their commitment, ultimately distinguishing be-
tween their intuitive conceptions (what made personal
sense to them) and what they had learned from instruc-
tion. For example, Student E agreed with the notion of
localized atomic electrons, and continued with this line of
thinking as he first described the double-slit experiment.
The following excerpt begins as he was reflecting on the
statement made by fictional Student 1:
STUDENT E: I would agree with what [the
first fictional student] is saying, that the elec-
tron is traveling somewhere inside that prob-
ability density blob, and it is a tiny parti-
cle. The problem here that I see is that [the
fictional student is saying] the electron went
through one slit or the other. [PAUSE] So,
now I’m disagreeing with myself. OK, my
intuition is fighting me right now. I said ear-
lier that there should be one point in here
that is the electron, and it goes through here
and hits the screen, but I also know that I’ve
been told that the electron goes through both
slits and that’s what gives you the interfer-
ence pattern. Interesting. [LONG PAUSE]
OK, somehow I feel like the answer is going to
be that this probability density, it is the elec-
tron, and that can go through both slits, and
then when it’s observed with this screen, the
probability density wave collapses, and then
only exists at one point. But at the same
time I feel that there should be a single par-
ticle, and that somehow a single, finite parti-
cle exists in this wave, and will either travel
through one slit or the other. Why that par-
ticle would be affected by this slit, like its
direction, like why would it go here or here,
why would a single particle be affected by a
slit? That I don’t have an answer to, other
than that it’s the wave that’s actually being
propagated, the wave is the electron.
Regardless of what Student E may have learned during
the semester, his post-instruction thinking was initially
dominated by a particle ontology for electrons, regard-
less of the context. It is not that he hadn’t learned to
think about the double-slit experiment in terms of waves;
in fact, he had originally explained the fringe pattern as
resulting from wave interference. The association of the
wave with the electron itself was not cued until he was
confronted with the notion that each electron had passed
through a single slit. If the electron were always local-
ized, then this would be the only logical conclusion, but
he could not reconcile this with the experimental results.
Perhaps this student would have appealed to Ballentine’s
explanation for electron diffraction had he had known of
it, but he was still capable of switching to a more produc-
tive ontology when the need arose, even though it was at
odds with his intuition. We would argue, however, that
it would be preferable for students to avoid cognitive dis-
sonance when deciding what type of ontology to employ.
3. Copenhagen-like reasoning
Student F was one of three students who were explicit
about not thinking of an electron as either particle or
wave, but recognized that one description may be more
productive than another in particular situations. Just
before being asked to respond to the double-slit essay
question, he stated:
STUDENT F: I don’t really have much
of a conception of how it exists from here
where we emit it to the wall where it im-
pacts. You can’t think of it as a particle,
cause that doesn’t make any sense, and think-
ing of something that you know has a mass
as a wave doesn’t make much sense either. I
don’t really have much of a feeling of what
it is between [emission and detection], I just
know that it’s an electron, because I shot an
electron out and it hit the wall, so I have to
assume there was one in the middle. We can
conceive of it as this wave function, as this
7sort of smeared out thing of probability, but
since we can’t observe that, then I don’t re-
ally see the point.
Notice that, similar to Students A−D, Student F says
that it “doesn’t make much sense” to associate wave char-
acteristics with a entity that possesses mass. Later, after
reading the statement from fictional Student 1, he con-
tinued:
F: Like I said before, I don’t really see the
need for a conception of the electron between
[emission and detection], because we’re not
going to be able to observe it without chang-
ing it, so I disagree that it’s a particle. Well,
it is something that acts like a particle some-
where within that blob and it would techni-
cally have to go through one slit or the other
if we think of it as a particle, but every time
we try to observe that or verify it, it ruins the
experiment and produces another kind of in-
terference pattern, so you can’t know that it’s
a particle going through one slit or the other,
so I don’t know why it would be helpful to
think of it like that.
INTERVIEWER: So, if you were in class
and a student were to make this statement,
would you try to argue against it, or would
you just say that it’s not scientific to specu-
late if you can’t observe it?
F: Well, I would sort of argue against it, but
I don’t know how you can [argue that] it’s
a bunch of tiny particles somewhere in here,
and that’s going to come up with an interfer-
ence pattern. I don’t know how you would
make sense of the interference if you thought
of it as particles. If you thought of it as
particles that continued to obey this strange
probability cloud, then I guess you could go
with it. But I think if somebody next to me
said, yeah an electron is a particle so it goes
through one slit or the other, but we don’t
know which slit it’s going through and we
won’t... Again, we’re not going to see it, so
it’s not that it’s actually wrong, but I don’t
know that it would lead constructively to un-
derstanding why interference happens.
Student F disagrees with thinking of the electron as
a particle in the double-slit experiment, though he isn’t
willing to go so far as to say that it is “wrong” to do
so. Nor is he comfortable with describing it as a wave,
if that can’t be directly observed, but he concedes that
the wave description is more productive for explaining the
fringe pattern.
4. Pilot-Wave ontologies
All of the instructors considered in our studies were
explicit about particle and wave descriptions of electrons
being mutually exclusive; they may exhibit characteris-
tics of one or the other, but not both at the same moment
in time. Nor did they mention any type of Pilot-Wave in-
terpretation of the double-slit experiment, though we are
reminded that in-class instruction is not the only source
of information about quantum physics, and that students
are also capable of constructing their own ideas. Three
of the interviewees were fairly consistent in talking about
electrons as being simultaneously a particle and a wave,
such as Student G, whose description of the double-slit
experiment is remarkably reminiscent of Fig. 2. Here, he
is responding to the statement made by fictional Student
2:
STUDENT G: ‘The electron acts as a wave
and goes through both slits...’ Yeah and no, I
think it’s the probability, the possible paths,
it seems like the probable paths for the elec-
tron to follow interact with themselves, but
the electron itself follows just one of those
paths. So I don’t think the electron goes
through both slits. I think that the possible...
It’s like the electron rides on a track, like a
rail, like a train rides on a rail, but those rails
or tracks go through both slits, and the possi-
ble paths for the electrons to follow interfere
with themselves, create the interference pat-
tern, but the physical electron just rides on
the tracks, it picks one. Or maybe switches
paths, if two of them cross. I don’t know, it
seems that the electron has to be on one of
those tracks, but the tracks themselves cause
the interference pattern.
Not all students who viewed electrons as both particle
and wave were as imaginative in their thinking, but this
type of explanation have also been volunteered by stu-
dents in their written responses to the double-slit essay
question:
STUDENT H: I personally visualize the sit-
uation as a flow of some fluid that travels
through the two slits in waves. It appears
through all space as soon as the electron is
fired. The electron then rides this chaotic
fluid toward the screen and strikes in a lo-
cation that is somewhat determined by the
interference patterns of the fluid. Trying to
measure this fluid flow collapses the waves
created.
85. Matter-Wave ontologies
Six of the interviewed students bridged between par-
ticle and wave descriptions of electrons in the double-
slit experiment, such as Student I, who had just finished
reading the statement by fictional Student 1:
STUDENT I: No, I don’t agree with that.
The electron went through both slits, it
stopped being this blob the moment it hit the
screen, but before we detected it, it was that
blob. That was its probability distribution
function. That electron went through both
those slits, and it only stopped having that
large probability function when we detected
it. So yeah, I would say that’s false.
INTERVIEWER: What would you say if
you were sitting in class, and a student had
this argument that we just detect a single dot
in a specific case, and that makes me think
that an electron is a point particle?
I: Well, that’s the whole wave-particle dual-
ity. Like I said, it is one particle when we
measure it, and we determine it is one parti-
cle, but until we measure it, it is this probabil-
ity density function, and that electron did go
through both the slits. The probability was
split, and that’s why we pick up this interfer-
ence pattern, right? Yeah, so I pick up the
interference pattern because the electron, we
wouldn’t have picked up the interference pat-
tern if there was one slit, the electron would
have to go through both for there to be an
interference pattern, or else it would just be
the same as if going through one slit, or a 50%
chance of it going through one slit and 50%
chance... We wouldn’t observe this interfer-
ence pattern if it didn’t go through both, it
would have to go through both.
INT: You had said that this [blob] is the elec-
tron. What do you mean by that?
I: Well, it’s hard to conceptualize. For the
probability density, in a way it’s the elec-
tron, I mean it’s the electron’s wave function,
which I would say is just as valid a part of
the electron, you know, as anything else we
know about the electron. When that proba-
bility function splits, the electron, and goes
through both these slits, so does the electron.
Student I initially alternated between talking about
the electron going through both slits, and saying it was
the probability density that went through both. Only
later did he clarify that, for him, they are essentially one
and the same.
Finally, although Student J claimed to have accepted
the Matter-Wave perspective as a legitimate way of de-
scribing an electron, he still maintained a sophisticated
Agnostic stance:
STUDENT J: The way I think of an elec-
tron, I cannot ascribe to it any definite posi-
tion, definite but unknown position. I mean,
it may be that way, but I think that some-
how the electron is represented by the wave
function, which is just a probability, and if we
want to localize it then we lose some of the
information. So whether this is true or not is
something of a philosophical question. I wish
I knew, or understood it, but I don’t. For
now, for me, the electron is the wave function,
so whether the electron is distributed among
the wave function, and when you do an exper-
iment, it sucks into one point, or whether it
is indeed one particle at a point, statistically
the average, I don’t know.
We characterize Student J’s agnosticism as sophisti-
cated because he recognizes there are multiple ways of
thinking about the situation, but doesn’t yet have suf-
ficient information to decide for himself which is more
likely to be correct. This sophistication might not be ap-
parent in other students who profess agnosticism, which
can in some cases actually be more of an expression of
confusion as to what it is that’s going on in the first place.
IV. DISCUSSION AND INSTRUCTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS
The preceding sections include multiple examples of
students and experts employing epistemological resources
that influence their ontological categorization of electrons
as particles: localized detections imply a continuously lo-
calized existence; massive (or charged) particles must be
localized in space; particles are by definition localized.
These types of resources are not necessarily wrong, and
might be productive when working with classical systems.
However, they can have important implications for what
kind of physical meaning is attached to the otherwise al-
gorithmic process of deriving wave functions and calcu-
lating expectation values. They may also interfere with
students attaining a deeper understanding of quantum
mechanics.
While some of the interviewed students did show a
lack of flexibility in their conceptions of electrons, most
others exhibited ontological flexibility to varying degrees:
some distinguished between intuitive and normative on-
tologies; some perceived switches between particle and
wave descriptions as physical transitions; others blended
attributes from classically distinct categories, or assigned
them separately according to which would be most pro-
ductive in that specific context. We believe this type of
bridging between parallel ontologies should be promoted
during instruction because it is an important aspect of
learning and understanding quantum mechanics.
9Moreover, if a single normative (scientifically accepted)
ontology for quantum entities does not exist, then Chi
and Slotta’s strategy of ‘ontological correctness’ during
instruction simply cannot be applied. There is no con-
sensus among practicing physics regarding the “correct”
ontological nature of electrons; in fact, most actually do
not concern themselves with such issues when engaged in
their research. This reality is reflected in the variety of
approaches instructors take when addressing interpretive
themes, often de-emphasizing the physical interpretation
of quantum theory in favor of developing mathemati-
cal tools, with demonstrable impact on student thinking
[16]. We would argue that instructors who take a Copen-
hagen/Agnostic approach to teaching quantum mechan-
ics are in essence preventing students from developing
mental models of quantum processes that could be pro-
ductive for their understanding. We have also demon-
strated that students will develop these mental pictures
on their own in contexts where instruction is less explicit,
and that such ideas have a greater tendency to be intu-
itively classical, so that directly confronting these intu-
itions in multiple contexts is essential.
Nor should we connote too much negativity with stu-
dents relying on their intuition as a form of sense making.
It is true that “everyday thinking” can sometimes be mis-
leading in quantum physics, but that is not a sufficient
argument for the complete abandonment of tools that
still have a range of applicability. It is not that a strictly
particle view of electrons is illegitimate, but the consis-
tent application of this ontology in all contexts can lead
novices to paradoxical or incorrect conclusions. Ballen-
tine may be content with describing diffraction patterns
in terms of quantized momentum transfers, but this ar-
gument entails concepts and mathematical tools that lie
outside the scope of an introductory course. It is also
unclear how this view can be reconciled with the fact
that atomic electrons do not radiate in the ground state,
or that the orbital angular momentum of a ground state
electron is zero in the Schro¨dinger model of hydrogen.
We would argue that one goal of instruction should be
to help make clear for students precisely when thinking
about an electron as a particle might lead them astray,
and when it would not (and similarly for waves).
At the very least, we would recommend that instruc-
tors be explicit with students about consciously separat-
ing classical and quantum ontologies (as in Fig. 5), so
that some of the reasoning we see invoked by students
(i.e., classical attribute inheritance) might be avoided.
However, we believe it makes more sense for instructors
to appeal to students’ intuitions about classical particles
and waves when teaching quantum mechanics (i.e., lever-
age students’ prior knowledge), while at the same time
developing epistemological tools to aid students in decid-
ing when either of these descriptions is most appropriate.
Informed by the results of our research, we have devel-
oped a modern physics curriculum with multiple aims,
among them: (i) make the physical interpretation of
quantum physics a course topic unto itself, and con-
FIG. 5. A comparison of classical and quantum ontologies,
wherein attributes such as mass and charge that are typically
associated with classical particles are separated out to become
a more global property of quantum electrons, while wave and
particle attributes are relegated to separate sub-categories.
sistently attend to student ontologies throughout the
course; (ii) help students acquire the language and re-
sources to identify and articulate their own (often un-
conscious) beliefs about reality and the nature of science;
and (iii) provide experimental evidence that directly con-
fronts their intuitive expectations. Our ultimate goal was
for students to be able to distinguish between compet-
ing points of view, to recognize the advantages and lim-
itations of each, and to apply this knowledge in novel
situations. In short, instead of trying to tell students
what they should and shouldn’t believe about quantum
physics, we provided them with logical arguments and ex-
perimental evidence, then let them decide for themselves.
This modern physics curriculum has been implemented
twice now at the University of Colorado Boulder, with re-
sults that indicate many of our objectives were achieved,
some of which are reported in Ref. [16], and in greater
detail in Ref. [15].
We decided to promote a Matter-Wave interpretation
in this course, because we believe it provides students
with the most consistent way of interpreting quantum
phenomena. For example, one topic in this curriculum
was single-photon experiments with a Mach-Zehnder in-
terferometer [31]. [See Fig. 6.] When just a single
beam splitter is present (Experiment X), each photon
is recorded in either one detector or the other, but never
both simultaneously - this result is often interpreted as
meaning each photon takes just one of the two paths
with 50/50 probability. When a second beam splitter is
present (Experiment Y), interference effects can be ob-
served by modulating the path length in just one of the
arms of the interferometer, which many interpret as each
photon taking both paths simultaneously. In a delayed-
choice experiment [32], the second beam splitter is ei-
ther inserted or removed after the photon has encoun-
tered the first beam splitter, but while it is still traveling
through the apparatus. Interference is observed if the
second beam splitter had been inserted, and otherwise
not.
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FIG. 6. In each of these two experiments X (one beam split-
ter) & Y (two beamsplitters), a single photon (ν) is sent to
the right through the apparatus. M = Mirror, BS = Beam
Splitter, D = Detector, NC = Coincidence Counter.
Some instructors would teach that whether the second
beam splitter was present or not determines whether the
photon took both paths or just one. This explanation
is dubious in light of how the choice between configura-
tions takes place outside the light cone of the photon’s
encounter with the first beam splitter; and students may
question how the photons (or they themselves) are to
know which type of behavior should occur. We taught
our students that each photon always takes both paths
simultaneously, regardless of whether the second beam
splitter is present or not. On the other hand, we also
explained that students could decide which type of be-
havior to expect depending on the “path information”
available. If it could be determined which path a pho-
ton had taken, then interference would not be visible;
if not, then interference effects could be observed. In
doing so, we appealed to students’ intuitions about clas-
sical particles (they are either reflected or transmitted)
and classical waves (they are both reflected and transmit-
ted). [Note that these strategies may also be employed
in the context of the double-slit experiment.]
In a midterm exam question during the first implemen-
tation of this curriculum, students were asked to explain
in which experiment (X or Y) they would expect photons
to exhibit wave-like behavior. Nearly 40% of students fo-
cused on the lack of which-path information, and 33%
said the availability of two paths for the photon was key
to predicting wave-like behavior in Experiment Y. As an
illustrative example, one student explained in their exam
response: “Since [the photon] can take either path and
still get to either photomultiplier, I know it can be rep-
resented as a wave [in Experiment Y].”
There is still a great deal of research to be done regard-
ing students’ quantum ontologies, but we have attempted
with this paper to lay some of the groundwork. Consider-
ing that we have observed strong associations for students
between particles and definite paths, it seems that cur-
ricular development efforts should explore more deeply
the usefulness for students of ‘which-path information’ as
an epistemological tool [two paths = interference (wave);
one path = no interference (particle)].
It would also be worthwhile to explore what connec-
tions (if any) exist between the ontologies students em-
ploy and their ability to set up and solve quantum me-
chanics problems; also, whether there are specific con-
texts in which one ontology has definite advantages over
others in terms of quantum mechanical calculations. In
particular, we suspect that many of the known student
difficulties with quantum measurement [33, 34] are rooted
in their lack of mental representations of the actual mea-
surement process and corresponding reduction of the
quantum state.
We also recognize that very little is understood about
the thinking associated with Agnostic students. Sophis-
ticated agnosticism would acknowledge the existence of
evidence that favors more than just a single interpreta-
tion; at the same time, an Agnostic stance may be indica-
tive of the perception that nothing can truly be known or
understood in science. Therefore, a deeper exploration is
called for of how students’ views on the nature of science
are impacted by learning about quantum physics.
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